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Abstract
Alongside the global tariff liberalization, a growing body of evidence demonstrates the rise in the use 
of non-tariff measures (NTMs), which suggests a substitution effect between these two import policy 
instruments. Yet, detailed economic data reveals that in countries with lower tariff rates (developed 
countries), the use of NTMs is significantly lower compared to developing countries, which implies 
a possible complementary effect between tariffs and NTMs across nations. Using a dataset of Kee, Nicita 
and Olarreaga (2009) on ad valorem tariff equivalents of NTMs, at a very disaggregated product level, 
this paper explores the determinants of NTMs and their substitutability/complementarity relations 
with tariff barriers. While exploiting the country variation, it demonstrates the decreasing trend of 
substitutability between the two import policy instruments with the rise in economic development. 
In particular, a significant complementarity correlation exists between the two trade measures among 
the wealthiest nations, implying a stronger commitment to freer trade. 
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, international trade has increased rapidly, largely due to a significant 
gradual elimination of tariff protection. Tariff reduction has been achieved either by successive rounds 
of multilateral trade negotiations, by unilateral liberalization, or by the creation of preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs). Since a notable share of PTAs was among developing countries, which originally 
commenced with higher tariff levels, it is no surprise that these countries in particular have pursued 
more far-reaching tariff elimination. Yet, the average tariff levels in low-income countries are still 
significantly higher than developed countries (WTO 2016).
Alongside the reduction of tariff rates, accumulated evidence shows a growing propensity in the use 
of non-tariff measures to trade (NTMs1) by many countries, which partially offsets the advancements 
achieved by lowering tariffs. Contrary to tariff measures, which were originally introduced in order 
to realize economic and trade objectives, the purported intention behind the imposition of NTMs 
was to design public objectives which are non-protectionist by nature. These policy measures often 
serve as the first-best instrument to advance various social, political or environmental protection 
objectives, as well as health and consumer protection. Nevertheless, these instruments have become 
popular in achieving economic goals, mainly claiming to correct market inefficiencies which arise from 
information asymmetries or imperfect competition. However, as the imposition of such procedures 
creates a beneficial advantage for players who participate in the trade arena, it is no wonder that the 
use of NTMs has expanded. The political economy literature demonstrates how policymakers, who face 
pressures to protect domestic producers, may choose to use NTMs more extensively. At the same time, 
it claims that NTMs are merely alternative channels of protectionism in disguise. These actions may 
even be intensified when the reduction of tariffs adversely affects the local producers’ performances or 
in times of economic downturn.
The use of NTMs varies considerably across countries, differing according to the specific type 
chosen, affecting diverse products, and fluctuating over time. Nevertheless, a common motive in 
various approaches which study their incidence validates the accelerated expansion of NTMs over time. 
In particular, some practices such as technical barriers to trade (TBTs) and sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures, which account for a large share of all NTMs, have been on the rise since the mid-90s, 
as shown in the increasing number of notifications of SPS and TBT measures reported to the WTO 
(Figure 1).  Moreover, this upward direction is well demonstrated by the substantial increase in the use 
of anti-dumping measures over the last two decades, mostly by developing countries.
As the continuous reduction of tariffs and the expanding use of NTMs move in opposite directions, 
increasing attention has been drawn to the possible substitution effect between these two import policy 
measures. The common consensus shared among scholars and supported by several empirical analyses 
claims that NTMs often enable countries to enhance restrictiveness, manipulate the terms-of-trade 
and reclaim possible economic losses due to tariff liberalization. These studies, which focus mostly on 
specific countries or particular NTMs, demonstrate the substitutability relation between tariffs and 
NTMs. This negative correlation emphasizes that new NTM restrictions simply replace the traditional 
ones (namely tariffs), in order to achieve similar objectives.
1  Despite minor differences, the terms non-tariff measures and non-tariff barriers are often used interchangeably. In this 
paper the term non-tariff measures will be used.
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This paper tests the proposition that although from the broad perspective a negative correlation may 
be found, a deeper analysis would reflect heterogeneity among countries. In particular, it will verify 
the diminishing trajectory of the substitutability between the two import policy instruments with the 
rise in GDP per capita. It will provide evidence that the more developed a country is, the less likely that 
NTM practices occur. In low-income countries, the substitutability effect is dramatically high; however, 
the rationalization is counter-intuitive, since high levels of applied tariffs are found alongside a modest 
imposition of NTMs.  Low levels of NTMs are the outcome of the complexity and high costs associated 
with operating administrative and regulatory systems. Secondly, low-income countries are more 
revenue oriented, thus depending mostly on tariff income. Thirdly, their dependency on world trade 
as well as their commitment to freer trade is less robust than the richest countries. Lastly, low-income 
countries enjoy greater flexibility in terms of binding overhang gaps, which significantly decreases 
their motivation to impose NTMs. The binding overhang gaps are essentially the differences between 
the bound levels and applied tariff rates on each product granted to countries under WTO rules.
On the other hand, high-income countries that generally levy lower levels of tariffs are comparatively 
more committed to transparency and non-discrimination practices that result in lower levels of NTMs. 
Those developed countries are generally at the frontline of WTO discussions, hence they are more 
involved in the process of eliminating TBT and SPS measures. This means taking upon themselves 
the removal of trade barriers more extensively than elsewhere. Moreover, since high-income countries 
tend to rely more profoundly on international trade, it leads them to seek better conditions, both for 
domestic importers, as well as for their local exporters in foreign markets. Such interests co-exist with 
the necessity to attract imports at the lowest costs possible for the benefit of domestic consumers as 
well as for importers of intermediate goods. These reasons are expected to lead to less substitutability 
or even a greater complementarity correlation between the two import policy measures.
The proposition mentioned above is further supported by evidence based on a recent dataset of Kee, 
Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) accompanied by the authors’ calculations. Figure 2 portrays how countries 
with lower levels of tariffs also impose lower NTMs. This cross-country analysis demonstrates that 
complementary correlation exists between the two import measures, alongside negative correlation 
with the level of economic development. Moreover, data on NTMs coverage ratio draw similar 
conclusions regarding the positive correlation of tariff levels and the number of products affected by 
NTMs. Additionally, a strong correlation is found between the average number of NTMs at the chapter 
level and the tariffs (UNCTAD 2013). Taken together, these results demonstrate how a low tariff regime 
may be paired with a less stringent NTM policy. Such findings reinforce the complementary relation 
between the two import policy instruments, hence creating a paradox with the shared consensus on 
substitutability.
Despite their significant impact on trade and the reporting requirements to notify NTMs to the 
WTO with clear information regarding the products affected, systematically collected data regarding 
their implications is still hardly available. Economic studies address NTMs in a narrow setting, 
mainly in a qualitative approach, whereas in practice NTMs are broadly employed and change over 
time alongside the constant appearance of new types of NTMs that may require other analytic 
methodologies. Throughout the years, several attempts were made in order to collect information 
on NTMs (i.e. MAST, TRAINS). Nevertheless, to some extent, these quantifications usually address 
specific types of measures, countries, and products, and it is still not sufficiently comprehensive or lacks 
the broader perspective.
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Recently, this gap has been addressed by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) who tried to overcome 
various challenges and created a unique dataset of ad valorem equivalents (AVE) of NTMs at 
a disaggregated level (i.e. the 6-digit level of the HS classification). Their work provides estimations 
for tariff equivalents of NTMs of 104 countries (developing and developed), while comprising 
information regarding more than 30 types of NTMs. Among these measures are price control, quantity 
restrictions, monopolistic measures and technical regulations, agricultural domestic support and others. 
The extensive data set consists of observations on ad valorem equivalents of NTMs expressed as 
a percentage of the value of the product, making them directly comparable with tariffs.
The possible direct comparison provides the starting point for this paper, as it allows 
an econometric-based analysis of the substitutability/complementarity correlation of NTMs and 
tariff barriers to be undertaken. Moreover, the current analysis will outline the heterogeneity across 
countries and emphasize the diminishing negative correlation between the two import measures with 
the rise in countries’ level of economic development. By performing an in-depth and comprehensive 
analysis which differentiates between country groups, this paper aims to add an important dimension 
to the basic correlation analysis offered by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009), which focuses on the broad 
perspective. Secondly, it will contribute to the existing knowledge by investigating some additional 
determinants of NTMs, providing a more precise characterization and motivation behind their 
pervasiveness. One imperative explanatory variable for that matter is the binding overhang ratio, which 
represents the flexibility between bound and applied tariffs, and in turn the incentive to alternate 
to NTMs. Other control factors which are taken into consideration and influence the restrictiveness 
of NTMs are trade openness, import revenues, and others.
The paper is comprised of five sections. Following an introduction, the second section portrays the 
characterization of the use of NTMs across countries. The third section outlines the literature review, 
starting with the relations between tariffs, NTMs and trade, followed by a description of the approaches 
used to quantify the restrictiveness of NTMs, succeeded by the particular methodology of Kee, Nicita 
and Olarreaga (2009) which served for obtaining the data on AVE of NTMs in the analysis. The fourth 
section presents the methodology which was chosen to conduct the econometric analysis in the paper, 
accompanied by a discussion of the results of the estimations, along with several robustness checks. 
The last section of the paper underlines the main conclusions which can be drawn from the research.
2  The characteristics of the use of NTMs across countries
The scope of use of non-tariff measures varies significantly according to their type, nature or the 
objectives to be achieved. Evidence indicates that, in general, the average country imposes technical 
barriers to trade (TBT) on about 30% of products and trade. Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures, which are exclusively related to agriculture and food products, are imposed on more than 
60% of agricultural products, which in fact represents slightly less than 15% of overall trade. Among 
non-technical measures, pre-shipment inspections, for example, affect on average approximately 20% 
of trade and products (UNCTAD 2013).
NTMs also differ considerably across countries, depending much on each country’s comparative 
advantage and political economy preferences. NTMs imposed on agricultural products are likely to 
be greater and more restrictive in countries with a stronger comparative advantage in producing 
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agricultural products. These factors are demonstrated in the use of SPS measures and quantity and 
price control measures, which tend to be more predominant in developing countries. Countries, which 
rely heavily on domestic production of traditional sectors such as agriculture will use these instruments 
more extensively compared to developed countries. At the same time, richer countries, which are often 
concerned about shielding import-competing industries, or preserving the interests of infant industries, 
are found to impose TBTs more extensively than elsewhere.
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 point out the differences between the impositions of 
NTMs across country groups. They provide a snapshot of the average statistics on various variables such 
as tariffs, NTMs, and others. These figures are grouped according to the level of economic development 
of the countries (based on GDP per capita categories). The figures indicate that except for the lowest 
income group, the richer a country is in terms of GDP per capita, the lower its use of NTMs. While the 
AVE of NTMs in lower-middle income countries is roughly 15%, in upper-middle income countries and 
in high-income countries the average is 10% and less than 9%, respectively. The exception to this rule 
is the case of low-income countries, where although the average AVE of NTMs is relatively low (4%), as 
demonstrated in Figure 3, there is a large variance across these countries. For example, in the African 
continent, Rwanda (0.3%) and Kenya (1.3%) are at the lowest end, while Sudan and Nigeria are on 
the highest end with an average AVE of NTMs which reaches 40%. Complementary studies show that 
although on average NTMs are utilized for slightly less than half of the list of 5,000 products, in the 
African continent Tanzania and Senegal use NTMs substantially less than Egypt or Uganda. In Latin 
America, the imposition of NTMs by Argentina is double that of Chile or Paraguay. More examples 
could be found in Asia, where Bangladesh, Syria and the Philippines utilize NTMs much more than 
Cambodia or Indonesia.
Furthermore, as seen in the descriptive statistics, richer countries are more committed to the 
reduction of all types of barriers to trade, as internationally agreed under the general principles 
of the WTO. Therefore, the average use of NTMs among the richest countries is the lowest found 
across all countries. These countries are typically more open and dependent on international trade, 
and consequently are less likely to employ NTMs compared to countries, which are more self-reliant. 
On the other hand, with some exceptions, the less developed a country is, the less likely it will be open 
to competing for import flows. The low-income countries, which rely profoundly on revenue generating 
tax measures such as import tariffs, will prefer not to operate a costly and complex administration. 
Furthermore, low-income countries also enjoy a bigger overhang gap (the difference between bound 
and applied tariffs), which allows them the flexibility to increase their level of actual tariffs legally.
While exploring the use of NTMs across countries, it is essential to tackle specific characteristics 
of countries such as export performances as well as those who are the natural trading partners. 
In general, high-income countries tend to export more than lower income countries (by share of GDP), 
and their exports are mostly directed to other rich nations. The low and middle-income countries still 
trade mostly among themselves, though in the last decade these countries increasingly expand their 
exports to higher income countries at the expense of their traditional markets. Trade data shows that 
the developing countries’ share in world merchandise exports have expanded dramatically from 17% to 
43% during the last 25 years (WTO 2016).
Moreover, although the low-income countries may enjoy better market access conditions relative 
to the past, they still face larger financial and manufacturing constraints. These capacity constraints 
make it even harder for them to overcome the barriers posed by NTMs. Given the fact that low-income 
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countries specialize in traditional exports such as agriculture, textile, and apparel goods, and suffer 
from higher capacity constraints, it is even more worrisome that these countries face substantial 
obstacles in the form of high substitutability of tariffs with NTMs in their main exporting markets. 
This problem is further amplified by evidence of recent ITC business surveys on NTMs, which indicate 
that exporters of agricultural products report more problems related to TBT/SPS measures than 
exporters of manufactured goods – 59% compared to 34% respectively (WTO 2012).
3 Literature review
3.1 NTMs, tariffs and trade in the literature
In recent years, a growing interest has emerged around the characteristics of NTMs and particularly, 
over their impact on trade restrictiveness and on the welfare of nations.  This paper builds both on 
existing political economy theories, as well as on the empirical literature on the determinants of 
governments’ imposition of NTMs in response to decreasing tariffs. It primarily attempts to contribute 
to the strand of literature analysing the political economy environment of trade policy, which is based 
on Grossman and Helpman (1994), and has been tested empirically in several studies. While the authors 
laid down the foundations of the role of domestic interest groups, others, such as Mansfield and Busch 
(1995), have focused on the domestic political influence of institutions and the impact of deteriorating 
macroeconomic conditions. The later found that these factors explain the variance between countries 
in the demand for NTMs protection by pressure groups. Lee and Swagel (1997) establish that countries 
pair these two trade measures in order to protect vulnerable industries which are politically important 
or those threatened by import competition. Yu (2000) highlights the importance of transparency and 
the presence of informed consumers on the government’s decision to substitute voluntary export 
restraints (VERs) with tariffs. Furthermore, Yu claims that an increase in foreign competition will not 
cause the government to substitute NTMs for tariffs; however, a rise in the government’s valuation of 
political contribution might do.
The vast majority of the literature suggests that substitutability between NTMs and tariffs exists 
alongside the implementation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). These agreements lower the 
rate of protection, but often do not reduce the domestic pressure for protectionism. The law of constant 
protection phenomena suggests that producers who are well-protected by tariffs may care less for 
NTMs relative to industries adversely affected by the economic impact of decreasing tariffs, which 
may often receive NTMs protection as a substitute (Bhagwati 1988). By employing data on Turkey’s 
tariffs and NTMs, Limao and Tovar (2011) exploit the variation in tariff constraints generated by 
multilateral agreements and PTAs. They establish a causal impact of the resulting tariff constraints on 
the likelihood and restrictiveness of NTMs. By considering the differences in the size of EU member 
states in a PTA, they show that if the common EU tariff had constrained Turkey in its tariff setting, 
this could have had a causal impact on protection via NTMs on non-EU exporters. They find evidence 
of policy substitution between tariff commitments imposed via the WTO and the PTA with the EU and 
the increasing probability of Turkish NTMs.
An important role in the country’s decision regarding the extent of the use of NTMs is accredited 
to the market power it has over its trading partners. Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008) demonstrate 
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that significantly higher NTMs are used in import-competing sectors, where there is a greater ability 
to affect foreign exporters’ prices. Moreover, countries with sufficient market power, or even small 
countries (mainly non-WTO members), who in certain products face lower export supply elasticities 
(inelastic supply), will charge higher tariffs and also be driven to force a more protectionist approach 
by imposing NTMs. Aisbett and Pearson (2012) establish the substitutability correlation between 
SPS measures and tariffs, by suggesting that countries manipulate their environmental and health 
standards for protectionist purposes. The authors claim that there is a race to the bottom, meaning 
that tariff liberalization puts downward pressure on standards in countries which already have low 
standards (namely developing countries) and upward pressure on countries with high-standards 
(developed countries). Bagwell and Staiger (2014) introduce the globalization fatigue hypothesis and 
claim that developed countries suffer from insufficient bargaining power in the multilateral and 
bilateral negotiations arena, relative to developing countries. That, in turn, may trigger them to tighten 
the imposition of NTMs in order to form trade policy space (or make room) for future negotiations 
with developing countries.
Using data on specific trade concerns (STCs), Beverelli, Boffa and Keck (2014) find clear 
substitutability between past reductions in applied tariffs and SPS measures in both developed and 
developing economies, and same negative correlation between tariffs and TBTs only in developed 
countries. In line with these results, however, from the exporting country perspective, Orefice (2015) 
shows that lowering tariff by 10% corresponds to a 0.18% and 0.36% higher probability of observing 
an STC on SPS and TBT respectively. This figure is even further magnified when the raising and the 
imposing country belong to the same income group.
While interest in studying TBT and SPS has been growing in recent years, much of the relationship 
between tariff liberalization and the detailed level of specific NTMs focus mainly on anti-dumping 
(AD) measures. Moore and Zanardi (2011), who study how past trade liberalization impacts the decision 
to adopt antidumping laws, demonstrate that except for heavy users of AD among the developing 
countries there is no statistically significant substitution effect of trade liberalization on AD initiatives. 
By contrast, Feinberg and Reynolds (2007), who based their analysis on 24 countries for the period from 
1996 to 2003, identify that tariff reductions increased both the likelihood and number of AD petitions, 
especially for developing countries. Their concept of quid pro quo implies a quiet agreement which 
exists between nations on switching traditional tariff policies by NTMs. They conclude that multilateral 
trade reductions are the cause of the recent growth in new users of anti-dumping policies. Bown and 
Tovar (2011) reaffirm the substitution effect by analysing India, which recently became a heavy user 
of antidumping measures. They demonstrate how India’s liberalization reforms in the early 1990s have 
resulted in a higher probability of AD filings and increased safeguard restrictions.
In the reviewed literature it is not always evident that substitutability between tariffs and NTMs 
prevails. At times, the two measures follow the same direction, i.e. when countries charge high tariffs, 
they also employ high NTMs and vice versa. Support for the existence of complementarity correlation 
is predominantly accredited to the necessity to protect domestic production of sensitive consumer 
goods, textiles, apparel, and agriculture (Ray 1981).  Moreover, Trefler (1993) and Lee and Swagel (1997) 
provide evidence for the positive correlation, showing that the measures are often used together to 
increase the protection granted to import-competing sectors. Both argue that NTMs are less likely to 
be imposed on export-oriented industries, at least partly because of fear of foreign retaliation. Trefler 
uses a two-equation structural model of the determinants of NTMs and imports across US industries, 
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taking into account variables such as import penetration and factors like capital and labour. Lee and 
Swagel (1997) use disaggregated cross-country, cross-industry data for wages, production, trade barriers 
and trade flows of manufactured goods across 41 countries. After accounting for industry and country-
-specific factors, countries tend to protect especially the weak industries, declining sectors, politically 
important sectors or those threatened by import competition. Lee and Swagel conclude that the 
causality between the motives for using the trade measures might be reversed, or that trade barriers 
could influence industry conditions rather than policymakers responding to industry-specific calls 
for protection. Both papers argue that import penetration, or its growth, is positively correlated with 
the willingness of policymakers to impose NTMs.
Dean et al. (2009), in their cross-country analysis, find that in the case of fruits and vegetables, as 
well as for apparel products, the joint use of tariffs and NTMs significantly reduces the impact of NTM 
on price. They use city level retail price data to directly estimate the average impact of core NTMs on 
the prices of 47 consumer products grouped into four separate sectors for more than 60 countries in 
2001. Their model attempts to explain the observed price gaps due to NTMs, given observed differences 
in local markups, transport costs and differences in tariffs, in addition to some random unexplained 
factors. Moreover, they suggest that in some sectors, the restrictiveness of NTMs is highly correlated 
with country income; however, they do not provide interpretations as to this relationship.
Essaji (2010) proves that the motivation to increase the use of TBTs reflect the growing awareness 
of consumption externalities.  His conclusion puts a question mark over the aspiration of governments 
to protect domestic firms profits in a tariff constrained environment. Essaji uses a two-country Cournot 
duopoly model in order to demonstrate how governments will choose to increase technical regulations, 
on condition that the net marginal benefit of the regulation increases with falling tariffs. It further 
reinforces the intuition that tariffs and regulations may be complements, in cases where tariffs fall and 
cause a substantial increase in the consumption externalities.
As already seen, the literature review provides various viewpoints regarding the correlation between 
particular NTMs and individual countries or country groups. Yet it lacks an overall perspective along 
with an in-depth analysis of the determinants of NTMs, and the correlation between all NTMs with 
their corresponding tariffs, while differentiating country groups. The current paper aims to address 
this gap by adding to the existing literature an analysis of the correlation between the use of both trade 
policy measures, while uncovering the heterogeneity across countries. In particular, it will provide 
evidence for the diminishing negative trajectory of the correlation between the two import measures, 
with the rise in the country’s level of economic development. Furthermore, it will supplement common 
knowledge by providing additional determinants for the use of NTMs, such as the overhang gap, which 
can further explain the motivation behind their occurrence.
3.2 Quantification of NTMs
The quantification of NTMs is required in order to measure their impact on trade restrictiveness and 
on welfare as well as their relation with additional macroeconomic variables. Unlike tariffs, for which 
the available quantitative databases enable the evaluation of their levels and changes, NTMs are much 
more challenging to quantify. The main explanation for this difficulty is that NTM restrictions may 
take many different forms and often the information regarding these measurements are not publicly 
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available or satisfactorily transparent. In order to better investigate aspects regarding the impact 
of NTMs, one must use reliable methods, which allow the transformation of qualitative practices 
into measurable quantities. Generally, these methods allow the calculation of the ad valorem equivalents 
of NTMs, i.e. the ad valorem tariff rate that would induce the same level of imports.
Approaches for quantification of NTMs
Along the years, several analytical approaches were developed in order to tackle the challenging task 
of quantification of NTMs. The approaches use various methodologies to overcome the heterogeneous 
nature of NTMs and particularly the lack of available detailed information regarding their 
implementation across products. The approaches differ in the various assumptions adopted, as well as 
by the econometric tools which were used for estimating their value, conclusiveness, and changes over 
time. The most common methodology is the inventory approach presented by the frequency index and 
the coverage ratio. This approach allows the quantification of the incidence of NTMs and captures 
the percentage of products that are subject to one or more NTMs in the case of the frequency index. 
The coverage ratio basically measures the percentage of imports that are subject to one or more NTMs.
An additional approach, called the price (or wedge) gap, approximates the degree to which 
a specific regulatory measure or policy intervention raises domestic prices above international 
prices. These approximations are built on comparing prices of goods affected by an NTM with goods 
unaffected by the NTM. The main disadvantage of the price gap method is that it is often difficult 
to create two price measurements for the same good and establish that one fully reflects the effects 
of an NTM, whereas the other is unaffected. Several price-based econometric techniques attempt to 
build on the foundations behind the price gap method and expand it to several countries and products 
simultaneously. An example for such an exercise on various OECD countries is found in Deardorff and 
Stern (1997).
Alternatively, the literature proposes the quantity-based econometric approaches, which allow the 
estimation of the impact of trade policies, such as NTMs, on trade flows. These methods usually employ 
analysis of trade data using the gravity model, factor content model or combinations of features from 
both models. The trade data may be comprised of import values or quantities, or similarly, export 
measurements. Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) used the famous gravity equation in their 
empirical framework, in which given estimations of import demand elasticities serve to drive price 
effects or ad valorem equivalents of NTMs.
Notwithstanding the many advantages of these approaches in the quantification of NTMs, they 
also attract certain criticism. The most common critique is that estimations of NTMs should be 
crafted with detailed knowledge of products and markets. Ferrantino (2006) adds that estimations 
should be done while analysing one product and country at a time; however, the collection of data 
requires excessive resources and often disallows the capturing of many products and countries at once. 
This leads to a trade-off between handicraft and mass-produced estimates of NTM effects.
Moreover, in recent years, thanks to technical improvements some computable modelling 
simulation methods were developed in order to measure the effects of changes in NTMs on a wide 
variety of economic parameters. These simulations were originally developed in order to estimate the 
effects of policy changes such as tariffs on prices, production, or on macroeconomic indicators such 
as GDP or welfare. The most familiar example in that respect is the computable general equilibrium 
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(CGE) simulation employed by the global trade analysis project (GTAP). Lastly, several external sources 
of information, such as business surveys, may complement the approaches mentioned above. These 
surveys aim to address the difficulties that exporting firms face, mainly in developing countries. 
An example is the International Trade Centre (ITC), which assembles responses from firms to the 
most burdensome NTMs and ways in which they are affected. Additionally, the CoRe NTMs database 
assembles information from various sources, among them, the US Trade Representatives – National 
Trade Estimate Reports on Foreign Trade Barriers and the EU’s Market Access Trade Barriers database.
Ad valorem equivalents of NTMs by Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga
The model that will be employed in the current paper uses observations from a dataset of ad valorem 
tariff equivalent of non-tariff measures (AVE of NTMs) developed by Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga 
(2009). The authors estimated the AVE of NTMs using a quantity-impact approach combined with 
approximations of import demand elasticity of nearly 5,000 products in 104 countries. Their non- 
-linear least square estimation, which is based on the gravity model, allows the capture of information 
regarding the impact of various NTMs on each country’s imports. The NTMs include, among 
others, price control measures, quantitative restrictions, monopolistic measures, anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures, technical regulations and agricultural domestic support. The dataset consists 
of ad valorem equivalents of NTMs, specified at the tariff line level (6 digit harmonized system of 
classifying goods).
At the outset, the authors use the following equation:
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is the import value of good n in country c evaluated at exogenous world prices, which are all 
normalized to unity so that imported quantities equal 
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is the import 
demand elasticity, which was obtained extraneously, 
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is a set of variables that control for k factor 
endowments (agricultural land, capital, labour force, GDP, etc.). The effect of core NTMs at the country 
level is estimated by the interaction term between the NTM dummy (for the presence of an NTM) 
and the vector of factor endowments of the country 
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, while DSn,c denotes the agriculture domestic 
support given to a product. α are tariff line dummies that capture any good-specific effect, while 
β is the parameter that captures the impact that the NTM imposed on good k in country i has on 
the corresponding imports.
At the second stage, the estimators are transformed into price equivalents, using the elasticities 
of import demand.
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The main advantage of the model is that it goes beyond the traditional approach relying on 
coverage and frequency indices. It is far more informative than other gravity-based approaches, which 
have dominated the evaluation of the effects of specific NTMs. Furthermore, the methodology allows 
a direct comparison of the relative effects on imports of removing tariffs versus removing NTMs, and 
providing a particular tariff equivalent of NTMs affecting each product, at any country.
4 Econometric methodology and data
In this research paper, the determinants of the government’s use of NTMs are examined as 
a compensative reaction to the existing low levels of MFN applied tariffs. Moreover, the Government’s 
decision regarding the magnitude of the imposition of NTMs is studied with respect to the extent of 
the binding overhang, as well as to several supplementary control variables, which are described below. 
The size of the sample which was developed for this purpose is comprised of approximately 200,000 
observations, encompassing data on 61 countries and between 3,500 to 4,500 tariff lines per country. 
The reason for the exclusion of certain countries from the original dataset is the lack of information on 
certain independent variables. Moreover, it allows some of the explanatory variables to interact with 
each other, and improve the goodness of fit of the model.
The sample used in the estimation includes a non-negligible part of the world economy and 
therefore, it is representative of the world as a whole in some dimensions. The sample comprises 
61 countries from all continents, while the average per capita GDP in the sample is USD 7,300, which is 
slightly higher than the world average of USD 6,400. The list of countries comprises 75% of the world’s 
population and close to 80% of its GDP (in PPP). This is due to the fact that it includes 14 out of the 
world’s 20 largest economies, among them the USA, Japan, France, China, Italy, Canada and others.
The econometric methodology used in this analysis is the following:
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For the purpose of this study, a log-linear transformation of the ordinary least squares (OLS) model 
has been employed. The dependent variable used in all the specifications is ln(1 + AVE_NTMi,n), which 
is the natural logarithm transformation of the ad valorem equivalents of NTMs. It is important to 
note that the number 1 has been added in order to control the zero values. As mentioned previously, 
the dataset on the AVE of NTMs was obtained from the econometric estimations of Kee, Nicita and 
Olarreaga (2009). Although the authors use information on NTMs from the period 1992 to 2002, 
the data on the AVE of NTMs employed in the current analysis is for one particular year during 2001 
and 2003, since the original estimation builds on the average trade data between the latter years. 
Each observation in the current analysis represents a tariff equivalent of NTMs in a specific country 
i on tariff line n. Regrettably, since the original dataset on the AVE of NTMs is specified exclusively 
for one year per country, it lacks the time-series dimension needed for creating a panel data analysis. 
Consequently, the econometric approach used in this analysis uses a cross sectional dataset based on 
the cross-country product-level.
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The econometric analysis is comprised of a vector of variables, which may account for control 
variables explaining the use of NTMs. The main control variable in the analysis is denoted as 
ln(1 + Tariffi,n), which is a vector of the most favoured nations (MFN) applied tariff rates. Similar to 
the calculation of the dependent variable, the number 1 has been added to the tariff values in order 
to control the zero values. Data for the variable is provided for each of the countries and expressed at 
the 6-digit HS level. The data source is the UNCTAD trade analysis and information system (TRAINS) 
database accessible via the World Bank, world integrated trade solution (WITS) software. In order 
to maintain the required consistency with the methodology used for the calculation of the AVE of 
NTMs, the tariffs used are for the most recent year for which data is available between 2001 and 2003. 
As the theory predicts, the correlation between Tariffs and NTMs is expected to be negative for the 
whole sample of countries. However, the heterogeneity among countries when grouped according 
to their level of economic development is predictably significant. Here, it is anticipated that the 
less developed group of countries will tend to substitute their tariffs with higher levels of NTMs. 
As the level of economic development increases, the substitutability decreases and the correlation 
becomes positive for the richest countries.
The second major control variable used in the analysis is tariff binding overhang (denoted as 
ln(1 + OverHangi,n), which represents the difference between the MFN applied tariff and the bound 
tariff. Data on the binding overhang was collected from the world integrated trade solution (WITS), 
which provides data from two different sources of WTO and TRAINS database (maintained by 
UNCTAD). Similar to the calculation of the dependent variable, the number 1 has been added to the 
overhang values in order to control the zero values. In the analysis, a disaggregated data on binding 
overhang was used at a 6-digit level of HS to be compatible with the data on the AVE of NTMs and 
Tariffs. It measures the degree of flexibility available in each country within its WTO obligations 
and often-called tariff water. The excess binding overhang is generally low in developed countries 
and in manufacturing sectors; however, it may reach very high levels in developing economies or in 
agricultural products. These stylized facts are well demonstrated in the descriptive statistics, where the 
more advanced the economy, the significantly higher the MFN bound rates are than the MFN applied 
rates (i.e. higher binding overhang). Moreover, it is expected that in cases of high binding overhang 
rates, countries may raise tariffs legally without breaking their WTO commitments, hence they will 
not alternate them by using NTMs.
A third control variable is Openness, which represents the share of trade in goods and services as 
a percentage of GDP. The data is collected from the Global Development Network Growth Database, 
for the similar specific year of the previous variables. This ratio is frequently used to measure the 
importance of international transactions relative to domestic transactions. Although this ratio is 
referred to as trade openness, the term openness may be slightly misleading, since a low ratio does not 
necessarily imply high barriers to foreign trade, but may refer to factors such as the size of the economy 
and geographic remoteness from its current and potential trading partners. It is likely that countries 
that are dependent on international trade (mostly the more developed countries) will employ fewer 
NTMs compared to countries that are more self-reliant.
The next variable Cus_Rev represents the share of revenues of countries from imports taxes, 
as a percent of their total tax revenues. The data source is the World Bank and refers to each of 
the countries according to the year specified. In general, NTMs differ from tariffs by the fact 
that these measures do not generate revenues to countries. Nevertheless, this analysis allows 
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an examination of whether losses of tariff revenues to countries could explain the motivation for 
increasing their AVE of NTMs. It is expected that the low-income countries that rely on import 
revenues are less likely to use NTMs since those are significantly less of a source of income. 
 Several dummy variables are included in the econometric analysis. These dummies are mostly 
used in the interaction terms in order to validate the hypothesis that substitutability decreases with 
the rise in GDP per capita. Moreover, these dummies allow an examination of whether there is 
a substantial difference between the correlation in tariffs and the AVE of NTMs for the agriculture 
products compared to non-agriculture products. The first dummy variable is D_Econ_Dev, which refers 
to the level of economic development of countries (i.e. GDP per capita, according to the classification of 
the World Bank). It takes the following values: 0 = low-income countries; 1 = lower-middle income 
countries; 2 = upper-middle income countries; 3 = high-income countries.  The dummy D_Econ_Dev is used 
in the analysis as part of an interaction term, together with ln(1 + Tariffi,n). The reason the interacted 
variables were also not included separately is that the effects of these variables are captured by country 
dummies. By creating the interaction term, it allows the capture of the particular correlation between 
tariffs and NTMs of each country group. By estimating the coefficients of the 4 groups, differentiated 
correlations reinforce the hypothesis that the less developed the countries are, the more likely that 
NTMs are served in order to substitute for tariff protection.
Additional dummy variables are D_Non_Agri, which is a binary dummy which takes a value of 1 
if the tariff line is associated with a non-agriculture product, and equals 0 if the tariff line refers to 
agriculture products. D_EU is also a binary dummy that takes a value of 1 if the country is a member 
state of the European Union, and equals 0 otherwise. Although at the time that the research was 
conducted there were 28 member states, since the data refer to earlier years (i.e. 2003 is the latest), 
and some data on NTMs were missing for some member states, only 10 member states are included 
in the sample. D_OECD is a binary dummy that takes a value of 1 when the country is a member of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and 0 otherwise. The sample 
used in the analysis is comprised of 15 OECD members, and the source of the information is the OECD 
website. Both EU member states and countries belong to the OECD are the more advanced economies, 
and as such it is likely that they are strongly committed to the WTO’s objectives to facilitate trade, 
hence they impose relatively lower NTMs.
5 Estimation results
5.1 General regressions results
The results of the regression analysis for the entire sample of countries are presented in Table 3.  
The first two columns report the findings of the basic specification, which include simply the main 
explanatory variables Tariffs and OverHang, while both country and product fixed effects are controlled 
simultaneously. Country fixed effects allow to control for the fact that some countries may have 
higher levels of both tariffs and NTMs than others due to their stronger participation in multilateral 
and bilateral trade agreements. Controlling for tariff line fixed effects indicates that some products 
may differ by their levels of both tariffs and NTMs due to domestic political economy strengths. 
From the third column onwards, additional plausible control variables which potentially determine 
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the prevalence of NTMs, are included. This was designed in order to test for the sensitivity of the results 
to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables, such as trade openness and customs revenues. 
As a caveat, while these correlations are relatively robust, econometrics alone cannot exclude the 
possibility of reverse causality between particular variables (i.e. trade openness) and the dependent 
variable. Therefore, an additional analysis of the partial correlation has been performed in order to 
prove the strength and direction of the correlation between the variables employed in the analysis. 
It shows that whilst controlling for the effect of other variables, the correlation is sufficiently significant 
and robust (the results are shown in tables 5 and 6). In column 4, the evidence is provided for the 
coefficients of tariffs and binding overhang for non-agricultural products relative to agriculture 
products. Column 5 presents an interaction term of tariffs and D_Econ_Dev, which shows the 
distinction between different country groups according to the level of economic development (i.e. GDP 
per capita). The goodness of fit of the model is satisfactory as approximately 35.6−38.0% of the variations 
in the NTMs are explained by the regressors specified.
Since the primary focus of this paper is to unveil evidence of a substitution effect between the 
applied tariffs and restrictiveness of NTMs, attention should first be drawn to the two control variables 
Tariff and OverHang. The findings are consistent with the expectations by most of the literature of trade 
protection theory. It shows that from an overall perspective which covers all countries in the sample 
the predetermined tariffs have a statistically significant and negative correlation with the import 
policy to impose NTMs. The result reinforces the idea that although countries agreed to lower tariffs 
during the Uruguay Round negotiations, they subsequently replaced some of this liberalization with 
a stringent NTM regime. The coefficient for the model estimating this correlation to the whole 
sample of countries implies that a 1% tariff decrease, leads to a 4.7% higher AVE of NTMs. In terms 
of economic magnitudes, it suggests that an increase in tariffs from 1% to their mean level of 9.3% 
(an 830% increase) decreases the AVE of NTMs by 39%, which is a considerable impact.
The degree of flexibility provided by the tariff binding schedules is considerably different across 
countries. It is generally lower in developed countries and in the manufacturing sector but reaches 
high levels in developing economies or in specific agricultural products. In column 2 the control 
variable OverHang is introduced and while the coefficient of tariffs (first row) does not change, the 
estimator for the binding overhang is found to be high and inversely associated with the use of NTMs. 
This clearly reinforces the notion that a bigger overhang gap allows countries to legally raise tariffs 
without breaking their WTO commitments. Without such a necessity, countries with a bigger binding 
overhang are less likely to substitute tariffs with NTMs.
From column 3 onwards, an additional set of variables is revealed in order to account for other 
determinants of the use of NTMs. These control variables include ln(Openness), which denotes the level 
of participation in world trade; ln(Cus_Rev), which is the share of revenues from imports, expressed as 
a percent of total tax revenues. Moreover, the specification of these models includes an interaction term 
between the country’s GDP and a dummy for each sector (HS section classification). This interaction 
term allows to control for similar political economy influences of same size economies at the sectoral 
level. As political economy theory suggests, specific interest groups may push governments to impose 
higher NTMs compared to other industries which are less organized. Adding this term increases 
the goodness of the whole model, from R-squared of 35.6% to 37.5%. Notice that the tariff coefficient 
remains relatively unchanged and significant at the one percent level, while it slightly increases 
the negativeness of the second control variable OverHang.
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Countries differ by their degree of reliance on international trade, and more specifically developed 
countries, which depend more on trade, generally impose on average fewer NTMs.  By reducing their 
overall barriers to trade in their own borders, these countries gain better market access and enhance 
their ability to penetrate easily to their counterpart markets. Moreover, the fear of retaliatory measures 
on the foreign demand for their exports similarly results in fewer NTMs. Other countries, typically the 
less developed ones, demonstrate a more self-reliant trade policy based on domestic production, and 
therefore these countries prefer to increase their barriers to protect sensitive industries from foreign 
competition. Consequently, as predicted, the estimators of the control variable Openness are found to 
be negatively correlated and statistically significant with AVE of NTMs, at the 1% level. The coefficient 
is found to be 0.3%, meaning that an increase of 1% in the share of trade in goods and services 
(as a percentage of GDP) will result in an 0.3−0.4% decrease in the use of distortive NTM restrictions. 
The results are in line with Mansfield and Busch (1995), who use a different control variable, 
i.e. the ratio of a country’s imports to world imports, for measuring countries participation in world trade. 
The findings are also consistent with Michalopoulos (1999), who notes that frequency ratios of quantity 
and price control measures tend to be higher in countries with lower levels of per capita income and 
lower degrees of openness.
When explaining the restrictiveness of NTM restrictions, the coefficient on the share of revenues 
from imports (percent of total tax revenues) is found to be statistically significant, negative and 
relatively small.  The negative sign of the coefficient indicates that an improvement in the country’s 
revenue from tariffs induces a fall in NTM protection. The coefficient shows that the AVE of NTMs 
are inversely associated with changes in the share of revenues from imports and that a 1% rise in this 
variable induces a 1.1% fall in NTM protection. The higher the import revenue as a share of total tax 
revenues, the less likely a country is to apply NTMs (and vice versa: a lower share of revenues from 
customs is associated with a higher prevalence of NTMs). Since NTMs differ from tariffs by the fact 
that these measures are not designed to generate revenues to countries, it seems worrisome that 
losses of revenues are in fact a source of concern for countries and a motivation for an increase in 
the imposition of NTMs.
Naturally, a considerable diversity among countries consists in the sensitivity towards local 
producers’ interests. Some may favour protecting import-competing industries at the expense of the 
exporting sectors. This is particularly predominant when protection of agricultural products is involved. 
Evidence shows that tariffs on agricultural products are on average much higher than those on non-
-agricultural products, although there is considerable divergence between countries. Countries with 
a special interest in agricultural products would most probably pair their high level of applied tariffs 
with a more regulated trade regime. This way, countries may keep all options on the table, meaning 
that when global pressure rises to remove one form of protection, they could still keep the other 
measure active. An empirical validation is given in column 4 displaying a comparison between the 
correlation of tariffs and the AVE of NTMs for non-agriculture products relative to agriculture products. 
This comparison yields the result that a 1% reduction of tariffs on non-agri-products generates a rise 
of 5.7% in the restrictiveness of NTMs, and this coefficient is statistically significant. The conclusion 
is that while the two import instruments are found to be paired in the two cases, the substitutability 
is stronger for non-agriculture products compared to agriculture products.
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5.2 Correlation across country groups
The most important results of the model are presented in column 5 of Table 3. The specification of 
this estimation introduces a supplementary interaction term between ln(1 + Tariffi,n) and the dummy 
variable D_Econ_Dev.  The objective of this exercise is to allow to differentiate between country 
groups while controlling for the heterogeneity driven by the extent of economic development. 
The data is disaggregated into four groups; based on the World Bank classification each group 
represents a relatively homogenous cluster of countries, grounded on their level of GDP per capita. 
The results of the estimation suggest that controlling for the applied tariffs jointly with the level of 
economic development plays a substantial role in determining the correlation between tariffs and the 
AVE of NTMs across country groups. From a broad perspective, the model provides evidence which 
reinforces the substitutability between NTMs and tariffs for the majority of countries. However, 
a deeper examination renders some additional conclusions about the trajectory of this correlation in 
the light of the country variation.
The results of the estimation validate the main proposition of the paper. They confirm that although 
the correlation between tariffs and NTMs is negative, the scale of substitutability diminishes gradually 
the more developed a country is. This trend continues until the negative correlation changes to positive 
for the group of high-income countries. Despite the fact that part of the estimators may be affected 
by the sample size, the trend seems to be evident, and the estimations are statistically significant in 
all groups. The estimators indicate that a 1% decrease in the tariff rate leads to approximately a 13.4% 
increase in the AVE of NTMs in low-income countries. In lower-middle income and in upper-middle 
income countries, a 1% decrease in tariff rate is associated with an 11.4% and 9.4% increase in the 
restrictiveness of NTMs respectively. While in all country groups mentioned above, the estimators are 
found to be negatively correlated and statistically significant, the correlation between the two import 
measures is found to be significantly positive in the high-income countries. A similar decrease in tariffs 
is associated with a dramatic fall of 23.8% in the restrictiveness of NTMs. These last results confirm that 
in high-income countries, NTMs are more likely to be restrictive, the higher the tariff on a product is, 
and vice versa.
The applied tariffs are relatively high in the least developed countries; thus, the estimations imply 
that the restrictiveness of NTMs in these countries is typically low. Although the correlation is found to 
be negative, the interpretation is fairly counter-intuitive. The cost of operating an administration system 
which deals with NTMs is usually high and it is naturally complex. Moreover, these countries rely on 
revenues generated from import taxes. Consequently, low-income countries use NTM restrictions less 
extensively, and therefore the correlation is negative. Nevertheless, the correlation also implies that 
for specific products where tariffs are low, the imposition of some restrictions on imports still exists, 
mainly in order to preserve domestic protection.
Since most of the middle-income countries have undergone the deepest process of tariff 
liberalization, there is no wonder that they practice NTMs more excessively. As supported by 
the political economy theory, this negative correlation is mainly a subsequent reaction to tariff 
liberalization. Governments that are subject to pressures from domestic interests, adversely affected by 
the dismantling of tariff barriers, are often impelled to increase alternative channels of protectionism. 
That, in turn, is demonstrated in the strong substitution correlation between the two import policy 
instruments. Claims against these countries for using NTMs excessively are being rejected by 
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the increasing awareness of health and environmental causes. However, the negative and significant 
correlation demonstrates the compensative effect between the two import measures.
As for the case of the richest countries, it is evident that the correlation is strongly positive, 
meaning that if a country belongs to the high-income country group, it will most likely pair the two 
trade measures. Since the average applied tariffs in high-income countries are relatively low, it implies 
a low restrictiveness of NTMs as well. Several reasons could support these findings. Firstly, these 
countries are at the frontline of the WTO negotiations on TBT and SPS measures, and are generally 
more involved in designing large parts the world trade regime. This multilateral arena aims to achieve 
the goal of facilitating trade obstacles, as well as simplifying market access to the developing world. 
Therefore, the most developed countries take upon themselves these objectives genuinely, which 
naturally means removing trade barriers more extensively than elsewhere. Moreover, since high- 
-income countries tend to rely more profoundly on international trade, it leads them to seek better 
conditions, both for domestic importers, as well as for their local exporters in foreign markets. Lastly, 
these interests coexist with the necessity to attract imports at the lowest costs possible for the benefit 
of domestic consumers as well as for importers of intermediate products.
5.3 Robustness checks and additional specification
Several robustness checks were performed in this last part of the paper. These checks were designed to 
test the validity of the results obtained in the general model when estimating different country groups 
according to geographical or organizational clusters. The results of these checks are robust and they 
reinforce the proposition of the paper. The developing countries demonstrate a strong substitution 
correlation in comparison to the rest of the world, while the richest countries such as the EU member 
states complement tariffs with an NTM regime. The results of the regression analysis are presented in 
Table 4.
MENA. A special geographical group that was examined is the Middle East and North African 
group (MENA countries). Despite the geographical and regulatory proximity, alongside increasing 
trade relations with the EU, most of these countries are still considered developing by nature. These 
countries’ GDP per capita is relatively low and the level of tariffs is rather high. Therefore, it is interesting 
to check whether the level of economic development influences more of the MENA countries’ NTM 
policy, compared with the mentioned proximities to the EU. The model estimate that tariff is inversely 
correlated with the AVE of NTMs, suggesting that a MENA import line whose tariff is 1% higher than 
another MENA member’s import line tariff has 6.7% lower AVEs for its imposed NTM. The estimator is 
found to be statistically significant; however, it is relatively smaller than that found for the low-income 
country case. The negative coefficient implies that the correlation between tariff and AVE of NTMs is 
substitutable and despite the low level of GDP per capita, the influence of the EU has a positive impact 
on the restrictiveness of NTMs. Meanwhile, a MENA country tariff line whose binding overhang 
is 1% higher than other MENA country tariff lines exhibits 2.5% higher AVEs of NTMs relative to 
the other tariff line.
OECD. The OECD organization is comprised of a heterogeneous group of countries. However, 
these developed countries typically have open economies and a relatively low level of applied 
tariffs. Despite some minor exceptions, this rule applies also to the low level of binding overhang. 
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The estimation for the tariff correlation with the AVE of NTMs suggests that an OECD import line whose 
tariff is 1% higher than other OECD members’ import line tariffs has 15% higher AVEs for its imposed 
NTM. The estimator is found to be statistically significant, and the positive high coefficient implies 
that the correlation between tariff and AVE of NTMs is complementary, for the reasons mentioned in 
the previous sub-section.
EU. The most remarkable positive correlation between the two import policy measures is found in 
the group of countries that belong to the European Union. These countries are constrained to a single 
customs union regime, meaning that the MFN applied tariffs for all these countries are similar for 
each product. The similarity, however, does not apply to all NTMs, which vary to some extent according 
to each country’s national regulations and domestic administration. The coefficient in the case of the 
EU demonstrates how an EU import line whose tariff is 1% higher than another EU member state’s 
import line tariff has 25.3% higher AVEs for its imposed NTM. The estimator is found to be statistically 
significant, and the high positive coefficient implies a strong complementarity between the tariff and 
the restrictiveness of NTMs. The fact that the EU does not substitute between the two import measures 
is fairly reasonable. The EU is part of an extensive network of PTAs, and the elimination process of the 
restrictiveness of NTMs started as early as in 1973, the year in which all internal tariffs were abolished. 
Furthermore, the EU has been one of the promoters of trade facilitation issues within the WTO and has 
taken upon itself the role of eliminating distortive measures to trade mostly, in favour of the developing 
world. With respect to the binding overhang, it is found to be inversely correlated with the AVE of 
NTMs at the one-percent level. Since the binding overhang of the EU is relatively small, this suggests 
that a 1% change of the gap is associated with a 5.5% decrease in the restrictiveness of NTMs.
6 Conclusions
The main objective of this research is to reject the common hypothesis that non-tariff measures (NTMs) 
serve as protectionist instruments in light of the global obsolete use of tariffs in a similar manner across 
all country groups. Moreover, it seeks to establish that the commitment to lower all forms of trade 
barriers increases with the country’s level of economic development. In order to realize these objectives, 
an econometric analysis has been undertaken, while exploiting a unique dataset of ad valorem tariff 
equivalents of NTMs at the 6-digit HS classification. The empirical results reaffirm that from a global 
perspective the correlation between tariffs and NTMs is negative and statistically significant. Yet, 
the study asserts that while taking into account the country variation, the substitutability effect 
diminishes with the rise in the country’s level of economic development. This proves that the higher 
a country’s GDP per capita, the less likely that it compensates for the adverse effects of tariff elimination 
with a growing restrictiveness of NTMs, while alternative considerations become relevant. Furthermore, 
the relationship between the two import policy measures changes its sign from negative to strongly 
positive in high-income countries at the lowest levels.
The paper argues that the most advanced economies have taken upon themselves stronger 
international commitments than less developed countries in order to achieve protectionist relief in 
a genuine manner. Such complementarity is also attributed to the fact that these countries are highly 
dependent on international trade, as well as to the response of policy makers to consumer’s interests 
to freer trade. This outcome is shown in the regression estimation, which clearly demonstrates 
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the significant extent to which high-income countries tend to pair their low levels of tariffs with 
similarly less restrictive NTMs. The empirical results of the analysis are further confirmed by the 
robustness checks of the correlation between the two import policy instruments when different 
country clusters such as the MENA countries, OECD and EU member states are examined.
Moreover, the analysis allows for additional control variables to serve as determinants for 
the extent of the restrictiveness of NTMs. Among these variables, an imperative role is given to 
the binding overhang gap and its effect on the AVE of NTMs. The binding overhang, which represents 
the difference between countries binding commitments and their actual applied tariffs, is a significant 
policy measure practiced by WTO member states. The results of the estimations validate that the less 
developed a country and the bigger the overhang gap, the less likely that the country imposes restrictive 
NTMs. The negative estimators reinforce the notion that countries that enjoy a larger binding overhang 
gap may raise their tariff legally without breaking their WTO commitments, hence they do not need to 
resort to compensatory measures such as NTMs.
The empirical framework employed in this study was based on a broad dataset, although it was 
limited in years. Therefore, in future studies and based on the availability of the AVE of NTMs it would 
be useful to investigate whether the findings reported in this paper held over recent years.
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Appendix
Table 1
Variables and sources
Variable Definition Source
AVE_NTM Ad valorem equivalents of non-tariff measures
the World Bank (Kee, Nicita,  
Olarreaga 2009)
Tariff Average applied tariffs (6-digit HS classification) Tariff Download Facility (WTO)
OverHang Gap between MFN applied tariff rate  and bound rate (6-digit) Tariff Download Facility (WTO)
Openness Share of trade in goods and services,  as % of GDP
Global Development Network Growth 
Database
Cus_Rev Customs and other import duties,  as % of tax revenue the World Bank
GDP Gross domestic product, current prices (USD billion) International Monetary Fund
GDPpc Gross domestic product per capita,  in current prices (USD) International Monetary Fund
D_Econ_Dev 
(dummy)
0 = low-income countries 
1 = lower-middle income countries 
2 = upper-middle income countries 
3 = high-income countries
the World Bank
D_Non_Agri 
(dummy)
0 = agriculture products 
1 = non-agriculture products the World Bank
Tariff . Non_Agri Interaction term of tariff and  D_Non_Agri
D_OECD 
(dummy)
0 = non OECD country 
1 = OECD member country OECD website
D_EU 
(dummy)
0 = non EU member states 
1 = EU member states European Commission
D_MENA 
(dummy)
0 = non MENA country 
1 = MENA country
Country FE Fixed effects of country variables
Product FE Fixed effects of products lines (6-digit  HS classification)
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Table 2
Statistical description
Country group Variables Mean Standard  deviation    Min        Max Observations
Low-income 
countries
Tariff 0.1350 0.1089 0 3.210 57,742
AVE_NTMs 0.0399 0.1711 0 2.990 57,742
OverHang 0.6343 0.3596 0 1.000 16,202
GDP 5.6480 8.091 0.4 30.500 53,221
GDPpc 0.3099 0.1643 0.139 0.829 57,742
Openness 0.5303 0.1993 0.288 0.945 57,742
Tr_Non_OECD 0.3827 0.2157 0.759 0.826 48,827
Cus_Rev 0.2630 0.1275 0.1577 0.535 40,174
Lower-middle 
income countries
Tariff 0.1534 0.3829 0 10.000 112,474
AVE_NTMs 0.1475 0.3055 0 4.560 112,474
OverHang 0.6513 0.3203 0 1.000 61,768
GDP 31.620 66.04 0.3 323.500 112,474
GDPpc 0.8140 0.483 0.306 2.310 112,474
Openness 0.6906 0.2634 0.219 1.240 112,474
Tr_Non_OECD 0.3414 0.1478 0.155 0.658 108,080
Cus_Rev 0.1581 0.0864 0.030 0.355 99,041
Upper-middle 
income countries
Tariff 0.1296 0.1471 0 10000 109,068
AVE_NTMs 0.0988 0.2618 0 4.790 109,068
OverHang 0.5439 0.3135 0 1.000 61,172
GDP 87.420 126.87 2.09 465000 104,522
GDPpc 3.1670 1.777 1.04 7.420 109,068
Openness 0.6917 0.4623 0 2.100 104,522
Tr_Non_OECD 0.2575 0.1114 0.0596 0.457 109,068
Cus_Rev 0.0942 0.075 0.0139 0.344 99,984
High-income 
countries
Tariff 0.0510 0.1437 0 10.000 145,135
AVE_NTMs 0.0893 0.2636 0 4.610 145,135
OverHang 0.2528 0.3742 0 1.000 94,852
GDP 538.51 1,137.9 1.1 5,800.500 145,135
GDPpc 18.200 9.956 2.096 37.820 145,135
Openness 0.7390 0.325 0.197 1.620 145,135
Tr_Non_OECD 0.2241 0.147 0.058 0.613 140,589
Cus_Rev 0.0427 0.101 0 0.438 131,815
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Table 3
Regression results; dependent variable: ln(1 + AVE_NTMs)
1 2 3 4 5
ln(1 + Tariff)   -0.047***(-11.06)
    -0.047***
  (-11.06)
   -0.049***
 (-11.56)
ln(1 + OverHang)    -0.286***   (-7.00)
   -0.369***
 (-17.45)
   -0.368***
(-17.42)
   -0.312***
(-14.72)
ln(Openness)    -0.003***  (-3.60)
   -0.003***
   (-3.66)
   -0.004*
  (-0.42)
ln(Cus Rev)    -0.011**  (-3.83)
   -0.011**
   (-3.94)
   -0.004*
  (-1.36)
ln(1 + Tariff) · D_Non_Agri    -0.057*** (-13.68)
ln(1 + Tariff) · low income    -0.134***  (-6.18)
ln(1 + Tariff) · lower-middle 
income
   -0.114***
(-22.24)
ln(1 + Tariff) · upper-middle 
income
   -0.094***
  (-8.80)
ln(1 + Tariff) · high income    0.238***  (8.03)
Constant  -0.022*** (-3.64)
   0.147***
  (8.04)
   0.851***
 (13.20)
   0.854***
 (13.24)
   0.724***
 (11.10)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2    0.356    0.356    0.375    0.375    0.379
Adjusted R2    0.342    0.342    0.360    0.360    0.365
F statistics 391.332 391.332 361.599 361.861 351.880
Observations 206,554 206,554 206,554 206,554 206,554
Notes: 
t statistics in parentheses;
p-value: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 4
Regression results, robustness checks; dependent variable: ln(1 + AVE_NTMs)
MENA OECD EU
ln_(1 + Tariff) -0.067***(-6.56)***
    0.150***
(4.90)***
0.253***
(2.84)***
ln_(1 + OverHang) 0.025***(3.37)***
0.006***
(1.73)***
-0.055***
(-7.49)***
ln_Openness -0.690***(-31.51)***
-0.007***
(-2.79)***
-0.004***
(-1.22)***
ln_Cus_Rev -0.038***(-18.79)***
-0.001***
(-3.56)***
-0.008***
(-10.17)***
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.359*** 0.338*** 0.457***
Adjusted R2 0.359*** 0.338*** 0.456***
F statistics 370.161*** 759.083*** 629.716***
Observations 21,443 71,657 47,289
Notes: t statistics in parentheses;
p-value: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 5
Correlations between variables (observations = 206,554)
Variable ln(1 +  AVE_NTMs)
ln(1 +  
Tariff)
ln(1 + Over 
Hang) ln(Openness) ln(GDP) ln(GDPpc) ln(Cus_Rev)
ln(1 + AVE_NTMs) 1
ln (1 + Tariff) 0.0778  1
ln(1 + OverHang) 0.0052  0.0163  1
ln(Openness) 0.0345 -0.1521 -0.0569 1
ln(GDP) 0.0711 -0.0904 -0.4603 -0.2483  1
ln(GDPpc) 0.0411 -0.2801 -0.4633  0.126  0.6445 1
ln(Cus_Rev) -0.0307  0.2974  0.5727 -0.1875 -0.5675 -0.749 1
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Table 6
Partial and semipartial correlations of ln(1 + AVE_NTMs) with observations = 206,554
Variable Partial  correlation
Semipartial 
correlation
Partial  
correlation ˆ 2
Semipartial 
correlation ˆ 2
Significance 
value
ln(1 + Tariff) 0.0989 0.0983 0.0098 0.0097 0.0000
ln(1 + OverHang) 0.0615 0.0610 0.0038 0.0037 0.0000
ln(Openness) 0.0718 0.0712 0.0052 0.0052 0.0000
ln(GDP) 0.0820 0.0814 0.0067 0.0066 0.0000
ln(GDPpc) 0.0009 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0689
ln(Cus_Rev) -0.0114 -0.0112 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
Figure 1
World average MFN applied tariff rates vs. SPS and TBT notifications
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Figure 2
World average MFN applied tariff rates vs. SPS & TBT notifications
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Figure 3
Mean of ad valorem equivalent of NTMs across countries
Source: calculations based on Kee, Nicita, Olarreaga (2009).
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